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OVER AND OUT: EXAMINING HOW COGNITIVE RADIO
WILL AFFECT FIRST AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS
ON BROADCAST MEDIA

I.

INTRODUCTION

Freedom of speech is an inalienable right, deeply rooted in the
United States Constitution. 1 Moreover, many consider free speech
to be the driving force behind democracy. 2 The ability "lIt] o debate
and vote, to assemble and protest, to worship, to ensure justice for
all . . . rel[ies] upon the unrestricted flow of speech and
3
information."
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 4 This
statement is somewhat misleading, however, because freedom of
5
speech is not an absolute and unrestricted right. Under certain
circumstances, the First Amendment may not protect speech, or6

even if speech is protected, the government may still regulate it.

Speech is regulated according to the medium through which the
7
communication is disseminated.

1. See What is Democracy? - Rights, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/
whatsdem/whatdm3.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) (explaining freedom of
speech under First Amendment is inalienable right, as specified by seventeenth
and eighteenth century Enlightenment philosophers).
2. See id. (suggesting democracy is communication). "Freedom of speech and
expression is the lifeblood of any democracy." Id.
3. Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
5. See DANIEL FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (Foundation Press 1998)
(2003) (noting "[a] lmost all of these few words are in some respect misleading," in
part because First Amendment was never "unconditional absolute" without
restrictions).
6. See id. (explaining First Amendment does not bar any governmental restriction on speech); see also STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL? CONFRONTING THE
LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 328-38 (MIT Press 2001)

(specifying ten types of unprotected speech: (1) obscenity; (2) child pornography;
(3) fighting words; (4) incitement to imminent lawless conduct; (5) defamation;
(6) invasion of privacy; (7) harassment; (8) true threats; (9) copyright infringement; (10) another recognized tort or crime).

7. See Amy Fitzgerald Ryan, Don't Touch That V-Chip: A ConstitutionalDefense of
the Television ProgramRating Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 87 CEO.
L.J. 823, 824 (1999) (noting broadcast television, cable television and print media
traditionally receive differing degrees of First Amendment protection).

(225)
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The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") regulates
broadcast media. 8 It confers licenses on broadcasters and regulates
"as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires," because the
amount able to be broadcast over the airwaves is limited by the
amount of spectrum available. 9 As a result, the government places
heightened restrictions on broadcast media in order to ensure
these communications are within the public interest.' 0
First Amendment standards concerning broadcast media are
distinct from those standards surrounding print media.11 Print media is a virtually inexhaustible resource and can therefore be published in abundant quantities. 12 Heightened restrictions imposed
on broadcast media are subject to lower standards of review than
restrictions placed on print media.1 3 As a result, the same restriction placed on broadcast and print media may be declared uncon14
stitutional for print media, but upheld for broadcast media.
Nevertheless, the advent of new technology brings with it the
ability to unshackle broadcast media from the current limits of
spectrum scarcity. 15 "Cognitive radio" is the technology that can
8. See Co-Communications
Marketing Glossary, http://
www.cocommunications.com/buzz-glossary.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2008) (defining broadcast media as "[c]ommunication outlets that utilize air space, namely
television and radio").
9. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214 (1943) (quoting Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307, 309, 310, 312).
10. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969) (explaining
government may place restrictions on broadcasts).
11. See Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership
Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 401, 433 (1989) ("Premised solely upon the supposedly limited nature of unsable [sic] spectrum, the Supreme Court has permitted federal governmental restraints upon the rights of broadcasters to
communicate via the radio wave.").
12. See id. ("[T]he Supreme Court has permitted federal governmental restraints upon the rights of broadcasters to communicate via the radio wave [s] ....
By contract [sic], the Court broadly prohibits governmental restraints on journalists' use of the print medium.").
13. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 836 ("Historically, regulations affecting the content of broadcast media have not been held to the strict scrutiny standard of review
applicable to content-based regulations of print media.").
14. See id. (showing how differences in transmission medium affect regulations government may place on particular forms of speech).
15. See Neil F. Carlson & Leonard M. Baynes, Rethinking the Discourseon Race: A
Symposium on How the Lack of Racial Diversity in the Media Affects Social Justice and
Policy, 21 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 575, 607 (2007) (explaining how new technology could make spectrum much more efficient, impacting First Amendment
rights of broadcasters); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364, 374-75 (1984) (defining spectrum scarcity as inherent limit on broadcast
transmissions).
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make this possible. 16 Cognitive radio technology uses software that
allows a kind of "self-awareness," enabling it to identify available frequencies and quickly switch on and off of them to avoid interference. 17 In fact, cognitive radio's utilization of digital signal
processors will provide nearly limitless channels for broadcasting,
resulting in "virtually infinite programmability."' 8 As a result of
cognitive radio, heightened restrictions on First Amendment
speech should no longer encumber broadcast media and rather,
broadcast media should be subject to the same standard of review
as print media when evaluating restrictions of free speech.1 9
This Comment explores the effect cognitive radio could have
on broadcasters' First Amendment rights. Specifically, this Comment describes various aspects of a cause action against the government, including: the allegation that heightened restrictions on

16. See Steven Ashley, Cognitive Radio: Smart Radios and Other New Wireless Devices Will Avoid Transmission Bottlenecks by SwitchingInstantly to Nearby Frequencies That
They Sense are Clear, Sci. AM. MAG., Mar. 2006, at 66 (specifying cognitive radio is
kind of technology that can "avoid transmission bottlenecks by switching instantly
to nearby frequencies that ... [it senses] ... are clear"). "[C]ognitive radio tech-

nology should enable nearly any wireless system to locate and link to any locally
available unused radio spectrum to best serve the consumer." Id.; see also Carlson
& Baynes, supra note 15, at 607 (explaining cognitive radio has capability to provide much more efficient spectrum use).
17. See Ashley, supra note 16, at 66.
18. Introduction to Digital Signal Processing, http://www.dsptutor.freeuk.
com/intro.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (defining digital signal processing as
"the processing of signals by digital means ... by performing numerical calculations"); see also FETrn, GENERAL DYNAMICS DECISION SYSTEMS: SDR TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE COGNITIVE RADIO 5 (2003), ftp://ftp.fcc.gov/pub/
Bureaus/EngineeringTechnology/Documents/cognitiveradio/fcccognitive-radiofettev8.ppt. With software defined radios, such as cognitive radio, "[a]ll functions, modes and applications can be configured and reconfigured by software."
Id. at 3. The digital processors used by software defined radios allow virtually unlimited programmability. See id. at 5; see also Digital Signal Processing, http://www.
ieee-virtual-museum.org/collection/tech.php?taid+&id=2345887&lid=l
(last visited Feb. 12, 2008) ("[A] nalog... signals are carried by continuously varying quantities, and digital . . .signals are restricted to a finite set of discrete values (often
just two, symbolized by 0 and 1)."). Furthermore, digital signals are often preferred to analog signals because, first, they "can be reproduced exactly," as long as
"a zero doesn't get turned into a one or vice versa." Id. Second, because the digital signal is simply a sequence of zeros and ones, digital signals can be manipulated
very easily. See id. By using digital signal processing, an individual is able to "filter
out unwanted parts of the signal, such as noise[,] ...build in error detection and
error correction... make the signal longer... [so] ...that any distortion of the
signal during transmission or recording can be detected and corrected.... [and]
...compress the signal, so that it can be transmitted more rapidly." Id.
19. See Ashley, supra note 16, at 66 (explaining why government can no longer
justify heightened restrictions for broadcast media if airwaves no longer pose
limitation).
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21
broadcast media are unconstitutional; 20 the standard of review;
the arguments the claimant would assert in advocating the unconstitutionality of heightened First Amendment regulations; 22 and the
arguments the government would provide in support of heightened
23
First Amendment regulations.
Section II presents the background for First Amendment rights
surrounding broadcast and print media; the differences between
these two forms of media; how the government treats them differently; and the nature of cognitive radio. 24 Furthermore, Section II
describes the requisite standing and standards of review applicable
to a claim alleging the unconstitutionality of heightened restric25
tions on broadcast media.
Section III analyzes the effect cognitive radio could have on

broadcasters' rights. 26 It further applies First Amendment case law

and regulations to a hypothetical First Amendment claim, detailing
27
likely arguments from both parties and how a court might rule.

Finally, Section IV concludes the Comment by suggesting that cognitive radio has the ability to transform the scarce broadcast media
spectrum into a virtually limitless spectrum, making First Amendment rights surrounding broadcast media analogous to those sur28
rounding print media.

20. For a further discussion of the cause of action, see infra notes 134-37 and
accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the standard of review, see infra notes 13841
and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the claimant's arguments, see infra notes 14260 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of the government's arguments, see infra notes
161-72 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion on the background of First Amendment rights
and cognitive radio, see infra notes 29-68 and accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion on the background of a potential claim, see infra
notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
26. For a further discussion on the effect cognitive radio will have on broadcasters' rights, see infra notes 92-127 and accompanying text.
27. For a further discussion and analysis of a hypothetical claim, see infra
notes 128-202 and accompanying text.
28. For a further discussion of cognitive radio's potential impact on First
Amendment rights, see infra notes 203-11 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND

History of First Amendment Free Speech

Although ratified in 1791, the First Amendment began to receive significantjudicial attention only a century ago. 29 For the first
half of the twentieth century, the test for regulating the First
Amendment right to free speech was the "clear and present danger" standard. 30 This meant that the government could only sup-

press speech if the speech in question created an immediate
societal danger. 3' During the late 1950s and early 1960s, however,
the civil rights era began to blossom and so followed changes to the
regulation of free speech. 32 A more "protective attitude" toward
free speech developed, particularly with regard to subversive
speech.3 3 Since the 1960s, courts have continued to broaden the
definition of free speech with increasingly more protective
34
interpretations.

B.

Governmental Regulation of Airwaves

Before 1927, no government-regulated means of allocating airwaves existed.3 5 Instead, "the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, and the result was chaos." 36 Reflecting
upon the disorganization and frequent interruption of broadcast

signals, the government determined that broadcast frequencies represented a scarce resource requiring and warranting governmental
regulation.3 7 Soon after, Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1927
and the Communications Act of 1934.38
29. See FARBER, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing First Amendment
developments).
30. See id. (explaining clear and present danger standard was originally devised as justification for censorship during times of war, particularly World War I
and World War II).
31. See id. (explaining "evolving judicial role" surrounding First Amendment).
32. See id. (describing progressive changes in court interpretations of First
Amendment rights during Civil Rights movement).
33. See id. (specifying increased protection of First Amendment rights for "libel suits brought by public officials against the press . . . the publishers of erotic
literature ... civil rights demonstrators and anti-war protestors." ).
34. See id. (explaining Court's interest in defining rules that govern speech
cases, leading to First Amendment laws with complicated multipart tests resembling legal code).
35. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969) (describing
evolution of broadcast regulation).
36. Id. at 375.
37. See id. (explaining initial concern regarding need for regulation).
38. See The Museum of Broadcast Communications, http://www.museum.tv/
archives/etv/U/htmlU/uspolicyc/uspolicyc.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2008) (ex-
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The Communications Act of 1934 created a system of free
broadcast service and ordered communications facilities nation39
wide to be licensed in a "'fair, efficient, and equitable' manner."
Further, it established and authorized the FCC to confer licenses on
broadcasters and to regulate the broadcast spectrum as public
"'convenience, interest, or necessity' requires." 40 In Red Lion, the
Court illustrated the nature of the "chaos" that gave rise to the
FCC's regulations and allocation of airwaves. 41 The Court explained that:
If 100 persons want broadcast licenses but there are only
10 frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the same
'right' to a license; but if there is to be any effective communication by radio, only a few can be licensed and the
2
rest must be barred from the airwaves.4
In order to divide the airwaves among its many users, the FCC
assigns specific frequencies of the radio spectrum to the highest
bidders. 4 3 To better understand the FCC's means of allocating airwaves, imagine a large plot of land up for sale. 4 4 Instead of selling
this piece of land as a whole, it is broken down into many divisions,
45
with each division auctioned off by the FCC to the highest bidder.
Each airwave licensee "rents" a swatch of the spectrum and no
other user may "trespass" on that licensee's swatch without
6
permission.4
plaining history of Radio Act of 1927, precursor to Communications Act of 1934).
"Congress first specifically regulated broadcasting with its 1927 Radio Act which
created a Federal Radio Commission designed to regulate in 'the public interest,
convenience, or necessity.' But federal regulation of communications was shared
by the Department of Commerce and the Interstate Commerce Commission." Id.;
see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC. 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (explaining adoption
of Communications Act).
39. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (quoting Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 307(b)).
40. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303).
41. See id. at 375 (explaining potential problem of having more demand for
broadcast transmissions than available airwave supply).
42. Id. at 388-89.
43. See Ashley, supra note 16, at 68, 71 (explaining how FCC allocates
frequencies).
44. See Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DIEGO
L. Riv. 269, 270-71 (2004) (introducing economist Ronald Coase's theory "advocating a property rights regime for spectrum.").
45. See Kim Hart, How to Sell the Airwaves?, WAsH. PosT, July 13, 2007, at DOI,
(explaining FCC's role in auctioning last remaining portions of spectrum).
46. See id. (describing how FCC auctions spectrum to licensees).
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Differences in Print and Broadcast Media

For almost a century, courts have held that the nature of
broadcast media is distinct from that of print media because the
volume of disseminated broadcast transmissions is inherently limited by the amount of airwaves available, whereas print media has
no such limitation. 47 This limitation on broadcast transmissions results from "spectrum scarcity.

'48

Spectrum scarcity refers to the

premise that broadcast transmissions travel over the airwaves, and
because the airwaves are a finite resource, not all broadcasts may be
transmitted simultaneously. 49 As a result of this limitation, broadcast media is subject to more restrictions and a heightened stan50
dard of review.
In Nat'l Broad. Co. v. U.S., 51 National Broadcasting Company

("NBC") and Columbia Broadcasting System ("CBS") sought to enjoin the enforcement of certain FCC broadcasting restrictions
under the theory that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech. 5 2 The Court, however, rejected the peti47. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969) (describing
airwave spectrum as inherently limited). This concept is often referred to as "spectrum scarcity." FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 374-75
(1984) (defining spectrum scarcity as inherent limit on broadcast transmissions).
48. Emord, supra note 11, at 402.
49. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)
(describing how spectrum scarcity makes airwaves exhaustible resource). But see
SeeJack Shafer, New Wave, The Casefor Killing the FCC and Selling Off Spectrum, SLATE,
Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2157734/ (suggesting spectrum scarcity is
"a function of technology and design architecture that inventors and entrepreneurs" create).
50. See Emord, supra note 11, at 433 (specifying distinction in regulation
among broadcast and print media is due to inherent limitation of broadcast transmission medium).
51. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
52. See id. at 194 (defining FCC restrictions). The restrictions in question are
as follows:
[T] he number of stations licensed to or affiliated with networks, and the
amount of station time used or controlled by networks; the contractual
rights and obligations of stations under their agreements with networks;
the scope of network agreements containing exclusive affiliation provisions and restricting the network from affiliating with other stations in
the same area; the rights and obligations of stations with respect to network advertisers; the nature of the program service rendered by stations
licensed to networks; the policies of networks with respect to character of
programs, diversification, and accommodation to the particular requirements of the areas served by the affiliated stations; the extent to which
affiliated stations exercise control over programs, advertising contracts,
and related matters; the nature and extent of network program duplication by stations serving the same area; the extent to which particular networks have exclusive coverage in some areas; the competitive practices of
stations engaged in chain broadcasting; the effect of chain broadcasting
upon stations not licensed to or affiliated with networks; practices or
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tioners' arguments.5 3 Instead, the Court held that because
broadcast media was not inherently available to all, "unlike other
modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation.

'5 4

In

doing so, the Court reasoned that as long as the FCC's regulations
were in the "public interest, convenience, or necessity," the regulations were constitutional. 55 Elaborating on this principle, the Court
in Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC5 6 stated that broadcast television was
unique from any other form of media because in broadcast television, "there are more would-be broadcasters than frequencies avail5
able in the electromagnetic spectrum."

7

Specifically, the Court in

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC determined that the FCC had the ability
to treat a broadcast licensee as "a proxy" for the community, obligated to give adequate time and attention to matters of public
58
concern.
In contrast, virtually no limit exists as to the amount of print
media able to be disseminated at any given time. 59 Thus, there is
no justification for the government to apply heightened restrictions. 60 The difference in treatment between broadcast and print
media was further exemplified in Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
agreements in restraint of trade, or in furtherance of monopoly, in connection with chain broadcasting; and the scope of concentration of control over stations, locally, regionally, or nationally, through contracts,
common ownership, or other means.
Id.
53. See id. at 226-27 ("Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to
use the limited facilities of radio.").
54. Id. at 226.
55. Id. at 215 (quoting language from Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 303, 307, 309, 310, 312).

56. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
57. Id. at 637 (1994); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
74 (1983) ("Our decisions have recognized that the special interest of the federal
government in regulation of the broadcast media does not readily translate into a
justification for regulation of other means of communication.").
58. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1969) (highlighting
FCC order requiring radio station to provide person attacked in broadcast with
tape, transcript, or summary of broadcast, as well as opportunity to respond).
59. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974) (explaining unlimited medium available for print iiiedia). "The power of a privately
owned newspaper to advance its own political, social, and economic views is
bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers
- and hence advertisers - to assure financial success; and, second, the journalistic
integrity of its editors and publishers." Id. But seeJack Shafer, The IncredibleShrinking Newspaper: Newspapers are dying but the news is thriving, StATE, June 24, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2144201/ (last visited February 24, 2008) (suggesting
many newspapers are falling out of use).
60. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (explaining
lack ofjustification for heightened restrictions on other modes of expression).
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Tornillo.6 1 The Court held that a Florida statute violated the First
Amendment because it required a newspaper, which attacked a political candidate's character, to afford free space for the candidate
to reply. 62 The Court explained that this was a violation of the First
Amendment's guarantee of a free press. 63 This holding contrasts
starkly with the holding in Red Lion, which required a broadcast
radio station to provide a person attacked on-air with a record of
64
the broadcast and an opportunity to respond.
The Court reaffirmed the distinctiveness of broadcast media in
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal. by specifying that "the absolute
freedom to advocate one's own positions without also presenting
opposing viewpoints - a freedom enjoyed, for example, by newspa'65
per publishers - is denied to broadcasters.
In sum, courts permit heightened federal restrictions on
broadcast transmissions while disallowing such restrictions on print
media. 66 Because the radio spectrum is a scarce resource, restrictions on free speech will be upheld as long as the restrictions are in
the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." 67 Moreover, broad68
casters are treated as proxies for the community at large.

61. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 248-49 (specifying differences in treatment for

print and broadcast media).
62. See id. at 243 (explaining newspaper does not have to provide room for
reply because newspaper is not governed by same rules as broadcast media).
63. See id. (commenting that placing restrictions on print media such as requisite room for reply is unconstitutional).
64. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969) (setting forth
rationale for broadcast restrictions).
65. 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984) (explaining that restrictions are upheld only
when they further substantial government interest). The Court recognized that
Public Broadcasting Act prohibited "any 'noncommercial educational broadcasting station receiving a grant from the Corporation' [Corporation for Public Broadcasting] to 'engage in editorializing.'" Id. at 366 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 399). The
Court held unconstitutional Section 399 of The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967
because it prohibited broadcasters from engaging in editorializing, thereby denying them the right to address their audience on matters of public importance. See
id. at 398-99.
66. See Ryan, supranote 7, at 836 (explaining differences in the regulation of
broadcast and print media).
67. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214 (1943) (quoting language from Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307, 309, 310, 312).
68. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389 ("There is nothing in the First Amendment
which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency
with others and to conduct himself as a proxy ..
").
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Cognitive Radio and How It Could Change the Allocation
of Airwaves

Currently, the FCC assigns specific frequencies of the spectrum
to various users. 69 These frequencies include AM and FM radio stations, VHF and UHF for television channels, and other frequencies
used for cell phones, cordless phones, GPS devices, radio-controlled toys and much more. 70 Because each user occupies a specific frequency, communication problems ensue when frequencies
overlap; radio stations get interference and cell phone calls get
dropped. 71 Presently, the only real option for the radio station listener or phone call receiver is to wait for the interference to
72
subside.
With the advent of new technology, however, airwaves may be
become virtually inexhaustible and free from interference. 73 Such
technology would make broadcast media as limitless as print media.74 Cognitive radio is the new technology that can make this possible. 75 Cognitive radio technology uses software that allows a kind
of "self-awareness," enabling it to identify "its ... environment and

location and then alter its power, frequency, modulation and other
operating parameters so as to dynamically reuse whatever spectrum
69. See Ashley, supra note 16, at 68 (explaining how FCC allocates
frequencies).
70. See id. (specifying kinds of devices that utilize airwaves).
71. See id. (describing how interference among broadcasters occurs); see also
Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74 FoRDHIAM L.
REv. 663, 674 (2005) (explaining how interference may be caused even once cognitive radio is implemented).
72. See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 71, at 666, 68-69 (explaining current
solutions to broadcast interference).
73. See generally Ashley, supra note 16 (introducing cognitive radio technology
as solution to spectrum scarcity because it "enable [s] nearly any wireless system to
locate and link to any locally available unused radio spectrum to best serve the
consumer."); see also Symposium, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Case of Regulatory Obsolescence, 13 Comm Law Conspectus 1, 8-9 (2005) [hereinafter Symposium, The Telecommunications Act of 1996] (explaining with implementation of
cognitive radio "[t]here is no theoretical limit to how finely the spectrum can be
divided.").
74. See Carlson & Baynes, supra note 15, at 607 (explaining inefficiencies of
current licensing system, giving rise to new technology that could impact broadcasters' rights).
75. See id. (suggesting cognitive radio will help avoid broadcast interference
problems); see also In the Matter of Facilitating Opportunities for Flexible, Efficient, and Reliable Spectrum Use Employing Cognitive Radio Technologies, 20
F.C.C.R. 5486, 5487 (2005) [hereinafter Facilitating Opportunities] (explaining
cognitive radio technology could improve efficiency, speed, and volume of
transmissions).
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is available." 7 6 In fact, cognitive radio's digital signal processors 7 en7
able the utilization of virtually limitless broadcasting channels.
Under this model, the "plot of land" analogy becomes inappropriate because the spectrum would not be auctioned-off. 78 Instead,
all users could share the spectrum because cognitive radio software
constantly searches for available frequencies and automatically
switches frequencies when necessary. 79 With this software-based design, a single portion of spectrum "real-estate" could be made expo80
nentially more efficient.
E. Background for a Hypothetical Claim: Requirements for
Standing and Standard of Review 8 '
1. Standing
Federal courts are prohibited from issuing opinions in response to hypothetical situations because Article III, Section 2,
Clause 1 of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to actual
76. Ashley, supra note 16, at 69.
77. See Digital Signal Processing, supranote 18 (defining digital signal processing as "the processing of signals by digital means ... by performing numerical
calculations"); see also FETTE, supranote 18, at 5 (explaining digital processors used
by software defined radios allow virtually unlimited programmability).
78. See Goodman, supra note 44, at 270-71 (introducing property rights regime for spectrum); see also Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the
Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 287, 394
(1998) ("Providing an appropriate regulatory space for unlicensed wireless operations is the only available option for allowing the development of unowned information infrastructure.").
79. See FET=E, supra note 18, at 5 (explaining many benefits associated with
cognitive radio, including elimination of sense of artificial scarcity). For instance,
under the current model, if X wishes to transmit to Y, but A is already transmitting
to B on that frequency, X will have to wait. See Natasha Devroye, Patrick Mitran &
Vahid Tarokh, Topics in Radio Communication: Limits on Communications in a Cognitive Radio Channel, IEEE COMM. MAG., June 2006, at 44, available at http://people.
seas.harvard.edu/-ndevroye/research/Devroye-Cognitive-COMMAG.pdf (explaining difference in how broadcast transmissions will function with implementation of cognitive radio). With the new model, A can continue to transmit to B and
a cognitive radio device will switch X onto a different, unused frequency so that it
can concurrently transmit to Y. See id.; see also Gerald R. Faulhaber, Wireless Telecommunications: Spectrum as a CriticalResource, 79 S.CAL. L. REv. 537, 539 (2006) (explaining benefits of spectrum with little or no property rights, eliminating division
of spectrum for exclusive use). But seeAbhijit Sur, Sharing Spectrum: Can a "Commons" Approach Help Maximize Spectrum Use? http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mONUH/is_9_37/ai107124045 (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) (noting
proponents of exclusive property rights believe lack of limits on power regulations
may cause interference).
80. See Ashley, supra note 16, at 68-69 (describing lack of efficiency under
current broadcast system).
81. Note the hypothetical claim set forth in Section III is based largely on the
fact pattern from United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
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"cases" and "controversies."8 2 Therefore, to file a claim against the
government, which challenges the heightened restrictions surrounding broadcast media, the claimant must have standing to assert the claim.8 3 In the case of broadcast media, the claimant would
most likely be a broadcaster who has been censored by the FCC as
"public interest, convenience, or necessity" requires.8 4
2.

Standard of Review

The standard of review will depend on the nature of the First
Amendment challenge: whether the FCC's broadcast regulations
are "content-neutral" or "content-based."8 5 A content-neutral regulation "appl[ies] to all categories of speech and do[es] not expressly prohibit any particular subject matter of expression."8 6 In
contrast, a content-based regulation "prohibit[s] some categories of

87
expression while allowing others."
Content-neutral regulations on broadcast media are usually
evaluated under the lowest standard of review, which is most deferential to the government, rational basis. 88 In contrast, content-neutral regulations on other forms of media are evaluated using

82. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
83. See CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES
72 (Aspen Publishers 2005) ("A person has standing if he or she has sufficient
stake in the controversy that he or she ought to be recognized as an appropriate
party to assert the claim.").
84. Nat'l Broad., 319 U.S. 194 (quoting language from Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a), 310, 312).
85. See Richard E.Wiley & Rosemary C. Harold, Communications Law 2003:
Changes and Challenges, 2003 PRAc. L. INST. 275, 425 n.119 (citing Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), which explained broadcast ownership rules
should be subject to lower level scrutiny because of spectrum scarcity). For content-neutral broadcast regulations "the 'rational' basis standard articulated in cases
such as Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC remains the correct constitutional standard to
apply to its broadcast ownership rules." Id. at 361; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 375-79 (1984) (specifying that because regulation against broadcasters is content-based, level of review falls somewhere between
strict scrutiny and rational basis: intermediate scrutiny).
86. National Coalition Against Censorship Glossary, http://www.ncac.org/
art-law/glossary.cfm (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
87. Id.
88. See Wiley & Harold, supranote 85, at 425 (describing Red Lion standard of
review); see also Danielle Diviaio, The Government is Establishing Your Child's Curfew,
21 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 797, 811 (2007) (stating that rational basis review
is "lowest level of scrutiny and hardest for a plaintiff to overcome .... ."); Kenneth
A. Klukowski, Armed by Right: The EmergingJurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 18
GEO. MASON U. Crv. RTS. L.J. 167, 183 (2008) (explaining regulation evaluated
using rational basis standard of review "presumes the challenged state action valid,
and upholds it so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
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intermediate scrutiny, which lies somewhere between rational basis
and the highest standard of review, strict scrutiny.8 9
Content-based regulations on broadcast media are usually reviewed under an intermediate level of scrutiny.90 Alternatively, content-based regulations placed on other forms of media are
evaluated using strict scrutinyY'
III.

A.

ANALYsis

Cognitive Radio Has the Ability to Change
How Broadcast Media is Regulated

The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."9 2 Nevertheless, heightened restrictions are placed on broadcast media because it is transmitted over an inherently limited medium:
airwaves. 9 3 With the arrival of cognitive radio technology, however,
89. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (holding that for
cable television "intermediate level of scrutiny [is] applicable to content-neutral
restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech."); see also League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 475 (2006) (stating that where
strict scrutiny applies state must justify regulation "by establishing that it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest . .

").

90. See Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 375-79 (describing intermediate standard of
review used with content-based regulation on broadcast media); see also Klukowski,
supra note 88, at 187 (stating regulation under intermediate standard of review is
presumptively valid and "will be upheld so long as it is narrowly tailored to further
a substantial state interest.").
91. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000)
(holding that § 505 of 1996 Telecommunications Act which "requires cable television operators who provide channels 'primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming' either to 'fully scramble or otherwise fully block' those channels or to
limit their transmission to hours when children are unlikely to be viewing" is content-based regulation that can "stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny."); see also
Ryan, supra note 7, at 836 (explaining content-based regulations on print media
are held to strict scrutiny standard of review). "Historically, regulations affecting
the content of broadcast media have not been held to the strict scrutiny standard
of review applicable to content-based regulations of print media." Id.; see also Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2375 (2007) (explaining "contentbased speech regulations are presumptively invalid" under strict scrutiny standard
of review). But see Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376 (specifying Court has "never gone
so far as to demand that.., regulations serve 'compelling' governmental interests"
when broadcast media regulations are in question).
92. FARBER, supra note 5, at 1.
93. See Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377 (describing broadcast media's inherent
limitation). "Spectrum scarcity" is the phrase used in reference to the premise that
broadcast transmissions travel over the airwaves, and these airwaves are a finite
resource through which a limited number of broadcasts may be transmitted. See
id. at 375.
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the spectrum may not be as limited as it once was. 94 In fact, it may

become virtually limitless. 95 Without limits on the amount of information that can be broadcast, broadcast media begins to look almost identical to print media, in that a nearly limitless amount of
information can be transmitted. 96 If cognitive radio creates the opportunity for a virtually unlimited use of spectrum, the restrictions
surrounding broadcast media should be lifted so that broadcast me97
dia is treated the same as print media.
1.

Cognitive Radio and the Commons Approach to Spectrum Licensing

Presently, the airwaves are like a large, divisible plot of land,
with the FCC auctioning portions off until it is completely sold. 98
Under this current model, little spectrum is actually used. 99 With
cognitive radio, however, "there is no theoretical limit to how finely
the spectrum can be divided."10 0 According to some experts in the
94. See Facilitating Opportunities, supra note 75, at 5487 (explaining possible
differences in efficiency, speed, and volume with implementation of cognitive
radio).
95. See Symposium, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 73, at 8-9
(describing cognitive radio's potential impact on spectrum). Committee notes
stated:
There is no theoretical limit to how finely the spectrum can be divided.
The faster the chip, the better are the new applications, and the more
efficient are the smart antennas, cognitive radios and transmitters, and
ultrawide band technologies which will allow more efficient use of the
spectrum and attract capital. The result of greater efficiencies should be
less regulation.

Id.
96. See Carlson & Baynes, supra note 15, at 607 (noting similarities between
print and broadcast media if no limitation on airwave spectrum exists).
97. See id. (explaining advancements in cognitive radio technology should re-

sult in decreased regulation).
98. See Hart, supra note 45, at DOI (explaining FCC's role in auctioning off
last remaining portions of spectrum).
99. See Symposium, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 73, at 8 (explaining FCC's current mode of licensing creates highly inefficient use of spectrum). Continuing with the land use analogy, if Sender 1 on Plot A wants to
transmit a message, but the plot is already being used to transmit a different message by Sender 2, Sender 1 must wait. See Devroye, supra note 79 at 44 (explaining
how broadcast transmissions would function differently with cognitive radio).
Even though neighboring Plot B is not currently being used, Sender 1 cannot
transmit the message using Plot B because Sender 1 does not have a license to use
Plot B. See id. If cognitive radio were being used, it would detect free space in Plot
B and would automatically switch sender l's signal from Plot A to Plot B. See id.
Furthermore, cognitive radio interprets digital, as opposed to analog signals,
meaning various signals may run on the same frequency, but as long as each is
encoded with a distinct pattern of zeros and ones, cognitive radio can sort out the
desired digital signal. See FE=rE, supra note 18, at 3 ("All functions, modes and
applications can be configured and reconfigured by software.").
100. Symposium, The TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, supra note 73, at 8-9.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol16/iss1/7
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field, the efficiency of the spectrum will increase as cognitive radio
technology becomes more advanced; such efficiency would make
content-based regulations, premised on spectrum scarcity,
unjustified. 10 1
In order to reach this point, however, the FCC's means of allocating spectrum must be changed dramatically; users must be able
to switch freely on and off of available bands within the spectrum
and without interference. 10 2 One potential solution, which would
allow users to move about the spectrum freely, is called the "commons approach."1 0 3 The commons approach to spectrum allocation proposes a spectrum with little or no property rights; the
commons approach is a system that eliminates the division and allocation of the spectrum for exclusive use. 10 4 According to advocates
of the commons approach, "spectrum is not like physical property
susceptible to division into parcels. Rather, like air - indeed as air spectrum is a medium for communications that is theoretically lim10 5
itless, depending on the capabilities of the systems that use it."
Instead of the FCC auctioning off portions of the spectrum to a
single user, under the commons approach, exponentially more
users will be able to take advantage of the airwaves without interference or delay.10 6 If cognitive radio is implemented in conjunction
with the commons approach, then a sweeping change regarding
the First Amendment rights of broadcasters must occur.
2.

Cognitive Radio: Changing the Standard of Review and Permissible
Level of Regulations Imposed on Broadcast Media

The regulations surrounding print media are minimal and provide that "[t]he power of a privately owned newspaper to advance
101. See id. (suggesting constitutional implications cognitive radio might
create).
102. See Faulhaber, supra note 79, at 5 (highlighting commons approach as
means of allocating spectrum).
103. Id.
104. See id. (explaining potential benefits of commons approach).
105. Goodman, supra note 44, at 272 (setting forth principles of commons
approach). This is in opposition to Ronald Coase's proposition to allocate the
spectrum using a "property rights regime." Id. at 271-72. Furthermore, many commons approach theorists support the thesis of this comment, suggesting that "[a]s
the capabilities of radio systems improve ... the carrying capacity of the airwaves
will dramatically expand and, conversely, the scarcity value of spectrum used to
justify private property rights will dramatically decline." Id. at 272.
106. See Faulhaber, supra note 79, at 539 (explaining utility of shared spectrum versus auctioning off portions so that no other user can take advantage of it).
But see Sur, supra note 79 (noting proponents of exclusive property rights believe
lack of limits on power regulations may cause interference).
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its own political, social, and economic views is bounded by only two
factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers, and
hence advertisers, to assure financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers."' 0 7 In contrast, the
regulations surrounding broadcast media are comparatively broad
and provide that the FCC may regulate broadcast media as it sees
fit, as long as the regulations are tied to the "public interest, conve1 08
nience, or necessity."
Furthermore, regulations of non-broadcast media are analyzed
for their constitutionality using higher levels of scrutiny than those
used for broadcast media regulations. 10 9 For example, if the FCC
imposes a content-neutral regulation on cable television or on print
media, the regulation will be reviewed using intermediate scrutiny. 10 In contrast, a content-neutral regulation on broadcast me-

dia will be reviewed using a rational basis standard of review, which
imposes the lowest level of scrutiny."' Similarly, a content-based
regulation on non-broadcast media will be reviewed using strict
scrutiny, which imposes the highest level of scrutiny, whereas a content-based regulation on broadcast media will be reviewed using in12
termediate scrutiny.'
Case law has established restrictions that the government can
impose upon broadcasters.'1 3 For example, the FCC has required
107. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973).
108. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194 (1943) (quoting
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a), 310, 312).
109. See Wiley & Harold, supra note 85, at 361 (explaining variation in how
regulations are reviewed depending on type of media used).
110. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (explaining content-neutral regulations placed on cable television or print media will be evaluated
using intermediate scrutiny); see also Klukowski, supra note 88, at 187 (defining
intermediate scrutiny). In order for a regulation to be upheld under an intermediate scrutiny standard of review, it must be "narrowly tailored to further a substantial state interest." Id.
111. See Wiley & Harold, supra note 85, at 425 (specifying broadcast media
content-neutral regulations are reviewed using lowest level scrutiny); see also
Klukowski, supra note 88 (stating rational basis standard of review "presumes the
challenged state action valid, and upholds it so long as it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.").
112. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 836 (explaining non-broadcast media regulations are evaluated using highest level of review, strict scrutiny); see also FCC v.
League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 374 (1984) (explaining contentbased regulations on broadcast media are subject to intermediate scrutiny).
113. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-79 (1969) (setting
forth requirement that radio station must give attacked individual opportunity to
respond); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 741 (1978) (holding FCC
can prohibit indecent speech transmitted via broadcast media); NAT'L Ass'N OF
INDEP. TELEVISION PRODUCERS AND DISTRIB. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 531 (2d Cir.
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broadcast television stations to allocate a certain amount of airtime
for programming that "encourage [s] diverse sources of programming and, incidentally, diversity of programming."1 14 Furthermore, the FCC may restrict some broadcasts that contain
profanities to certain times of the day.1 15 If broadcast media was no
longer subject to heightened restrictions and lower-level standards
1 16
of review, courts would have difficulty justifying such regulations.
With the Communications Act of 1934, "Congress created a system of free broadcast service and directed that communications facilities be licensed across the country in a 'fair, efficient, and
equitable' manner." 117 As time passed, Congress' intentions to cresystem remained
ate such a "fair, efficient, and equitable" broadcast
118
technology.
advancing
of
spite
in
same
the
The implementation of cognitive radio will create the fairest,
9
most efficient and most equitable broadcasting system possible."
With this change, however, come consequences that will affect the
nature of the First Amendment. 120 As a result of cognitive radio,
the amount of information able to be transmitted via broadcast me121
dia will be virtually limitless.

1975) (explaining prime time access rule requiring television stations set aside
time for diverse programming).
114. Indep. Television Producers,516 F.2d at 528.
115. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731 (describing how FCC can regulate George
Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words" radio segment broadcast during daytime because 18
U.S.C. § 1464 gives FCC power to regulate broadcasting by forbidding "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communications .... ).
116. See Ashley, supra note 16, at 66 (suggesting government cannot justify
heightened restrictions on broadcast media where airwaves are no longer limited).
117. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994).

118. Id.
119. See Symposium, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 73, at 8-9
(explaining how cognitive radio has ability to change current inefficiencies underlying FCC's current approach to allocating portions of spectrum); see also Faulhaber, supra note 79, at 539 (describing immense utility of commons approach).
120. See Facilitating Opportunities, supra note 75, at 5487 (suggesting most
effective and efficient way to utilize spectrum is using commons approach paired
with cognitive radio); see also Emord, supra note 11, at 442 (citing FCC v. League of
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984)).
121. See Emord, supra note 11, at 442-44 (specifying how broadcast media may

become, for First Amendment purposes, identical to print media). Because the
rationale behind broadcast media's heightened regulations and lower standard of
review is spectrum scarcity, cognitive radio would eliminate this rationale, and with
it, the ability for the FCC to impose heightened regulations reviewed under lower
levels of scrutiny. See id.
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The rationale behind the heightened broadcast restrictions is
spectrum scarcity. 122 If cognitive radio and the commons approach
are implemented, spectrum scarcity would cease to exist. 123 Without spectrum scarcity, it would be a violation of the First Amendment to restrict broadcast media any more than print media. 124
Similarly, it would be a violation to evaluate these restrictions using
a lower standard of review than that used for print media. 125 Specifically, the FCC should not be able to impose restrictions on
broadcast media as "public interest, convenience, or necessity" requires. 126 The regulations and standards of review applicable to
broadcast media must mirror those of print media. 127
B.

One Broadcaster Could Change First Amendment Scrutiny:
A Hypothetical Claim

Once cognitive radio comes into widespread use, the way in
which regulations implicating the First Amendment are evaluated
and applied should be changed to mirror those of non-broadcast
media. 12 8 Specifically, broadcast media should no longer be regulated as "public convenience, interest, or necessity" requires.' 29 Instead, broadcast media, like print media, should be limited by only
two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of viewers or
122. See id. at 439-69 (explaining "regulatory construct that the [scarcity] rationale supports" as well as possibility that technological advances could reduce
spectrum scarcity rationale, eliminating need for increased restrictions on speech).
123. See id. (setting forth implications of commons approach).
124. See id. (suggesting print and broadcast media should be regulated in
same way).
125. See Emord, supra note 11, at 442 (discussing scarcity rationale and new
technology). In FCC v. League of Women Voters, the Court again expressed its willingness to reassess its traditional acceptance of Red Lion's scarcity rationale if Congress
or the FCC sent a "signal ... that technological developments have advanced so far
that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required." Id. In
Syracuse Peace Council, the Commission sent the Court'just such a signal. Persuaded
by extraordinary growth in mass media outlets since 1969, the Commission concluded that Red Lion's lessened degree of constitutional scrutiny could no longer
be justified. Id.
126. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194 (1943) (quoting
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a), 310, 312); see also
Carlson & Baynes, supra note 15, at 607 (explaining how new technology could
impact First Amendment rights of broadcasters).
127. See Emord, supra note 11 at 441-42 (noting advancements in technology
as well as decrease in number of print media sources should result in same degree
of restrictions for broadcast and print media).
128. For further discussion of why First Amendment protections for broadcast
should mirror those of print, see supra notes 107-27 and accompanying text.
129. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a), 310, 312.
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listeners - and hence advertisers - to assure financial success and,

1 30
second, the integrity of its editors and producers.
The following hypothetical claim assumes cognitive radio and
the commons approach have been implemented and are in relatively widespread use.' 3 ' It outlines the nature of the claim, which
challenges the constitutionality of a content-based broadcast media
regulation.1 3 2 Specifically, it analyzes the standard of review, the
arguments the claimant asserts in advocating the unconstitutionality of the regulation and the arguments the government provides in
1 33
support of heightened First Amendment restrictions.

1.

The Claim

Claimant is a radio broadcaster that owns and operates a station based out of Utah.13 4 The Utah-Colorado border is only ten
miles from Claimant's broadcasting location, and the majority of
the station's listeners reside in Colorado. Claimant wishes to use a
portion of its airtime each week to broadcast a show called "Colorado Currency." On this show, several issues are discussed, including the benefits of Colorado's state lottery.
The host of the show is a passionate advocate of the Colorado
state lottery and actively encourages the show's listeners to participate in the lottery. Congress has, however, enacted federal lottery
legislation that prohibits a broadcaster in a non-lottery state, such as
Utah, from broadcasting any program that actively and regularly
130. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255 (1974) (referencing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973)). Regarding print media, Columbia Broadcastingprovides "[t] he power of a
privately owned newspaper to advance its own political, social, and economic views
is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence advertisers-to assure financial success; and, second, the journalistic
integrity of its editors and publishers." 412 U.S. at 117.
131. For a further discussion of the hypothetical claim, see infra notes 134-37
and accompanying text.
132. For a further discussion of the First Amendment considerations, see infra
notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 138-202 and accompanying text.
134. This hypothetical is largely based on the proceedings in United States v.
Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). Edge Broadcasting provides that a North
Carolina-based radio station, near the North Carolina-Virginia border, may not
broadcast lottery advertisements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1307, despite the fact
that approximately ninety percent of the radio station's listeners reside in Virginia,
a state that sponsors a lottery. See id. at 421-24. Only ten percent reside in North
Carolina, which does not sponsor a state lottery. Id. at 431-32. The Court uses an
intermediate standard of review in finding no violation of the First Amendment
because "[s]tates have long viewed [lotteries] as a hazard to their citizens and to
the public interest, and have long engaged in legislative efforts to control this form
of gambling." Id. at 421.
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promotes lottery participation in another state, such as Colorado,
13 5
because it is a hazard to Utah's citizens and to the public interest.
The FCC fined Claimant because Claimant's station hosts "Colorado Currency," which actively and regularly promotes lottery participation. As a result, Claimant is filing an action alleging that
Congress' content-based regulation violates its First Amendment
rights. 13 6 Claimant contends it should no longer be subject to regulations as "public interest, convenience, or necessity" requires behave drastically
cause cognitive radio and the commons approach
137
spectrum.
radio
the
of
nature
the
altered
2.

The Standard of Review

Currently, content-based broadcast media regulations are analyzed using an intermediate level of scrutiny, so that content-based
regulations are not necessarily presumed unconstitutional, as they
would be using strict scrutiny. 138 Instead, as long as the state has a
"substantial" interest in imposing the regulation, it will pass First
Amendment muster. 139 Where regulations are placed on nonbroadcast media, however, an attempt by the government to impose
content-based regulations that suppress speech is presumed unconstitutional. 140 Only a content-based regulation, narrowly tailored 4to1
serve a compelling state interest, can be deemed constitutional.1

135. See id. ("States have long viewed [lotteries] as a hazard to their citizens
and to the public interest .

.

. ").

136. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 375 (1984)
(setting forth claim suggesting content-based regulation violated First Amendment
rights).
137. Nat'l Broad., 319 U.S. at 194 (quoting Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a), 310, 312).
138. See Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 375-79 (explaining content-based regulations on broadcast media are subject to intermediate scrutiny).
139. See Klukowski, supra note 88, at 187 (defining intermediate scrutiny).
140. See BIEGEL, supra note 6, at 328-38 (specifying that content-based regulations on non-broadcast speech are generally unconstitutional "unless the regulation falls within some recognized exception or some other related rule of law.").
There are ten established exceptions, whereby content-based regulations can be
constitutionally placed on speech because these particular kinds of speech are unprotected under the First Amendment: (1) obscenity; (2) child pornography; (3)
fighting words; (4) incitement to imminent lawless conduct; (5) defamation; (6)
invasion of privacy; (7) harassment; (8) true threats; (9) copyright infringement;
and, (10) another recognized tort or crime. See id.
141. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 836 (explaining non-broadcast media regulations are evaluated using highest standard of review: strict scrutiny).
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Arguments from the Claimant

Claimant first contends that the heightened regulations sur142
rounding broadcast media are premised on spectrum scarcity.
Spectrum scarcity is simply a malleable "function of technology and
1 43
design architecture that inventors and entrepreneurs" create.
144
The better the technology, the less "scarce" the airwaves are.
Without spectrum scarcity, the rationale for heightened regulations
1 45
surrounding broadcast media is inapplicable.
Next, Claimant asserts that even though content-based regulations for broadcast media are usually evaluated using intermediate
scrutiny, as in FC.C. v. League of Women Voters, the FCC's recent
adoption of cognitive radio technology and a commons approach
146
to licensing requires a different, heightened standard of review.
Heightened restrictions evaluated under low levels of scrutiny are
no longer justified because cognitive radio and the commons approach have eliminated spectrum scarcity, thus eliminating the rationale for the restrictions.147 Specifically, Claimant maintains the
nature of the regulations imposed on broadcast media and the stan14
dard of review used should parallel those of print media. 8
142. See Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376 (defining spectrum scarcity as inherent

limit on broadcast transmissions). Also, Women Voters specifies that the level of
review for content-based broadcast regulations falls somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational basis: intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 380.
143. Shafer, New Wave, supra note 49.
144. Id.
145. See Facilitating Opportunities, supra note 75, at 5487 (explaining cognitive radio's effect on spectrum scarcity has First Amendment implications).
146. See id. (noting advances in technology have potential to free spectrum
from inherent scarcity). Specifically:
[C] ognitive radio capabilities are advancing to the point where spectrum
is no longer scarce. Multiple speakers can broadcast their views simultaneously with little, if any, degradation to either's voice. This radically
changes the constitutional analysis. There is no justification for the Commission to silence anyone's voice by assigning or selling the right to use
swaths of spectrum. There is certainly no constitutionally forgivable justification for selling a corresponding right to exclude others [sic] voices
where technology could allow all voices to flourish on a non-discriminatory basis.
Id.
147. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969) (explaining
government holds broadcasters to higher standards than other First Amendment
speakers because of limits inherent in spectrum scarcity). The court found there
was "chaos" amongst unregulated airwaves, which gave rise to the FCC's regulations. Id. at 375. "Without government control, the medium would be of little use
because of the cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and
predictably heard." Id. at 376; see also Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 375 (defining spectrum scarcity as inherent limitation on broadcast transmissions).
148. See BIEGEL, supra note 6, at 328-29 (explaining limitations on speech regulations that regulate). Specifically, "statutes and policies designed . . . to regulate
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Claimant argues that if the regulation is evaluated using strict
scrutiny, it cannot be upheld simply because it meets the "public
interest, convenience, or necessity" standard.1 49 The Utah broadcaster cannot be treated as a proxy for the Utah community as a
whole, representing its interests and values.1 50 Strict scrutiny generally presumes the governmental regulation is unconstitutional and
requires the state to justify the regulation "by establishing that it was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest .

"151.

of
Claimant contests that the state interest does not rise to the level
"compelling" and should not rise to the level of "substantial.' a5 2
The Court in United States v. Edge Broadcasting,Claimant argues,
analyzed a federal regulation banning non-lottery states from advertising out-of-state lotteries over broadcast radio. 153 Although the
regulation was ultimately upheld using intermediate scrutiny,
Claimant notes that the dissent was highly skeptical that a state
could find even a substantial interest in discouraging lottery participation, which is seen by some as a "vice" activity. 15 4 Specifically the
dissent suggested "it does not necessarily follow that [the state's]
interest is 'substantial' enough to justify an infringement on constitutionally protected speech, especially one as draconian as the reguspeech are unconstitutional if vague or overbroad." Id. at 328. Further, "speech
cannot generally be regulated on the basis of its content, unless the regulation falls
within some recognized exception or some other related rule of law." Id. at 32829.
149. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194 (1943) (quoting
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a), 310, 312).
150. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389 (explaining broadcasters are currently
treated as proxies for community at large, requiring them to provide adequate
coverage for matters of public concern).
151. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 475 (2006).
152. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 440 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("While a State may indeed have an interest in discouraging its citizens
from participating in state-run lotteries, it does not necessarily follow that its interest is 'substantial' enough to justify an infringement on constitutionally protected
speech ....").
153. See id. at 422 (explaining content-based regulation placed on broadcasters). Just as broadcasting began, the Communications Act of 1934 was enacted,
which, in part, prohibited the broadcast of "any advertisement of or information
concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme." 18 U.S.C. § 1304. In
1975, however, Congress amended the Act, allowing broadcasters to advertise staterun lotteries if the station is licensed to a state that permits a state-run lottery. See
Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 440 (describing nature of amendment).
154. See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 440 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining lotteries are generally no longer seen as vice activities). "[T] he ...change in public
attitudes toward state-run lotteries that this country has witnessed in recent years
undermines any claim that a State's interest in discouraging its citizens from participating in state-run lotteries is so substantial as to outweigh respondent's First
Amendment right...." Id.
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lation at issue in this case." 155 Furthermore, Claimant mentions
how the dissent contended that throughout recent history attitudes
156
toward lotteries have become generally positive.
Claimant, therefore, identifies this skepticism about a potential
state interest in banning speech in non-lottery states. 15 7 Claimant
further indicates that Edge Broadcastingwas decided over a decade
ago and attitudes toward state lotteries have become increasingly

positive over the years. 158 Lastly, Claimant highlights that Edge
Broadcastingcreated a heated disagreement and the Court was only
evaluating the regulation under intermediate scrutiny.1 59 As a result, Claimant purports that even if attitudes toward state lotteries
have remained the same over the last fifteen years, Edge Broadcasting
would not have passed constitutional muster if it was evaluated
under strict scrutiny and the regulation cannot be upheld. 160
4.

Arguments from the Government

The government first sets forth that signal interference results
6
from the way in which broadcasters use the commons approach.' '
The government suggests that the commons approach gives rise to
the "tragedy of the commons" phenomenon, which in this context
means that users of the common spectrum increase the performance of their own communications by increasing their transmitter
power, but only at the expense of other broadcasters. 162 This boost
in transmitter power increases interference and reduces the clarity
63
of other broadcasters' signals.'
155. Id.
156. See id. at 440-41 (suggesting that unlike past, currently, hostility toward
state-run lotteries is rare).
157. See id. (describing lack of substantial state interest in regulation).
158. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 440-41 (1993) (suggesting negative views of state lotteries are rare).
159. See id. at 418 (specifying substantial state interest is required to uphold
regulation).
160. See id. at 44041 (suggesting in dissent that regulations should not be
upheld under intermediate scrutiny).
161. SeeWeiser & Hatfield, supra note 71, at 674 (explaining how "the tragedy
of the commons" relates to commons approach to licensing). For the sake of argument, this Comment assumed that some degree of interference occurs after the
implementation of cognitive radio and the commons approach. See id. The tragedy of the commons is when "users increase their consumption of the resource
without taking care to ensure that they do not overuse the resource." Id. It has
been suggested that some are hesitant to implement the commons approach to
allocating spectrum because the phenomenon of the tragedy of the commons has
the potential to cause unwanted signal interference. See id.
162. Id.
163. See id. (describing implications of broadcasters' ability to increase transmission power).
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The government further suggests that users faced with diminished performance "retaliate by raising their own transmitter power
to compensate for the increased interference," thus giving rise to
the tragedy of the commons and unavoidable signal interference. 164 As a result of these limitations, the government finally extends its argument to purport that because the tragedy of the
commons effect produces interference, spectrum scarcity still exists. 165 Not all messages will transmit without interference and,

therefore, heightened restrictions surrounding broadcast media are
justified.

16 6

With spectrum scarcity still in place, the government proceeds
to evaluate the claim using intermediate scrutiny. 167 The government contends that because the nature of broadcast media remains
unchanged, broadcasters are still responsible for broadcasting information as "public interest, convenience, or necessity" requires. 168 Broadcasters should be treated as proxies for the
community.' 69 Therefore, looking to Edge Broadcasting,which upheld a similar regulation under intermediate scrutiny, the government argues this regulation should be upheld.' 70 The state has a
substantial interest in restricting this speech because gambling is
seen as a "'vice' activity that could be, and frequently has been,
banned altogether.'

7

' Therefore, the government maintains that

Utah's interest in restricting this kind of speech can be upheld
1 72
under intermediate scrutiny.

164. Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 71, at 674.
165. See id. (suggesting that without limits on transmission power signal interference will ensue under commons approach).
166. See id. (proposing signal interference will cause messages not to transmit
properly).
167. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 375-79 (1984)
(setting forth intermediate standard of review used for content-based regulations
on broadcast media).
168. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194 (1943) (quoting language from Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a), 310,
312).
169. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) (suggesting
broadcasters currently serve as proxies for community at large).
170. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993) (stating
Court is "quite sure that the Government has a substantial interest in supporting
the policy of nonlottery States, as well as not interfering with the policy of States
that permit lotteries").
171. Id.
172. Id. (setting forth appropriateness of intermediate scrutiny).
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Analyzing the Arguments
Claimant makes a very strong argument because it takes lan-

guage from previous First Amendment cases and suggests the only
reasonable outcome here would be to eliminate the heightened restrictions surrounding broadcast media. 173 Particularly, Claimant
shows that the Court has explicitly stated print media is treated differently because it is not operating under the same scarcity rationale as broadcast media.17 4 Claimant then reasons that if the Court
does not place heightened restrictions on print media because the
mode of transmission is not scarce, once broadcast media's mode of
transmission is no longer scarce, it too should not be burdened by
the imposition of heightened restrictions. 175 If this regulation is
evaluated using strict scrutiny, the government will have a high bur-

den to overcome because the regulation would be presumptively
invalid. 176 The dissent in Edge Broadcastingfurther bolsters Claimant's arguments because the dissent suggests that restrictions on lottery-related speech may not be upheld today, even if it were
177
evaluated using intermediate scrutiny.
The government, in contrast, presents a more contorted argument.1 78 Because the Court specified, on many occasions, that
spectrum scarcity is the rationale behind the heightened regulations surrounding broadcast media, the government is challenged
to set forth reasons why broadcast media should continue to operate under a different set of rules than print media once spectrum
scarcity is eliminated. 179 The government, therefore, is pressed to
173. For a further discussion of Claimant's arguments, see supra notes 142-60
and accompanying text.
174. See Nat'l Broad., 319 U.S. at 226 (explaining broadcast media is unique).
"Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is
its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is
subject to governmental regulation." Id. at 226.
175. For a further discussion of Claimant's arguments, see supra notes 142-60
and accompanying text.
176. See Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2375 (2007) (explaining "content-based speech regulations are presumptively invalid" when evaluated using strict scrutiny).
177. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 440 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("While a State may indeed have an interest in discouraging its citizens
from participating in state-run lotteries, it does not necessarily follow that its interest is 'substantial' enough to justify an infringement on constitutionally protected
speech .... ).

178. For a further discussion of the government's argument, see supra notes
161-72 and accompanying text.
179. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378-79 (1984)
(defining spectrum scarcity as inherent limit on broadcast transmissions, giving
rise to intermediate scrutiny); see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 394 (describing inherent limitation on broadcast transmissions is airwave spectrum).
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make the argument that if some degree of signal interference persists, the spectrum is limited.1 80 Specifically, as a result of interference not all broadcasts will be transmitted properly, so the
spectrum remains in some sense scarce.' 8 1
Unfortunately for the government, this argument does not
hold much weight because some degree of "interference" will likely
be present in all forms of media outlets.18 2 The bottom line remains, however: as a result of cognitive radio, the spectrum in
which broadcast transmissions are cast is no longer "scarce."1 8 3 Exponentially more transmissions are capable of being sent at any
given moment, and with the proper regulations on transmission
18 4
power in place, signal interference should not pose a threat.
Nevertheless, the government tries to twist the argument, proposing that the spectrum is still, in some aspects, scarce. 18 5 If the government's scarcity argument prevails, the rest of its argument will
18 6
likely succeed under intermediate scrutiny.
6.

The Outcome

Many legal commentators recognize that the heightened regulations imposed on broadcast media are somewhat illogical.1 8 7 To180. See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 71, at 674 (describing "tragedy of the
commons" with regard to commons approach).
181. For a further discussion of the government's argument, see supra notes
161-72 and accompanying text.
182. SeeWeiser & Hatfield, supra note 71, at 674 (explaining nature of potential signal interference using commons approach).
183. See Carlson & Baynes, supra note 15, at 607 (explaining inefficiencies of
current licensing system in addition to how cognitive radio could create more efficient system, impacting First Amendment rights of broadcasters).
184. See Sur, supra note 79 (explaining nature of regulations that can be imposed to limit signal interference under commons approach). See also Weiser &
Hatfield, supra note 71, at 674.
Notably, regulation can take a variety of forms, including (1) social norms
that limit certain types of behavior, (2) market ordering that creates incentives for and against certain types of behavior, (3) technical architectures that limit the range of possible behavior, and (4) traditional law
enforcement that punishes certain types of behavior. In general, commons advocates focus on some combination of the first three modes of
regulation, often contending that FCC regulation is unnecessary or only
minimally necessary to enable the commons model of spectrum management to succeed.
Id.
185. For a further discussion of the government's argument, see supra notes
161-72 and accompanying text.
186. See id.
187. See Shafer, New Wave, supra note 49 (stating FCC "still treats the radio
spectrum like a scarce resource that its bureaucrats must manage for the 'public
good,' even though the government's scarcity argument has been a joke for half a
century or longer.").
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day we live in an age where reading newspapers has become
increasingly rare.18 8 As a result, many daily newspapers are being
retired.18 9 Nevertheless, the number of television stations seems to
increase with every passing day. 190 Therefore, many reformers recognize this contradiction and actively promote the removal of
heightened regulations surrounding broadcast media, even without
the implementation of the commons approach or cognitive radio. 19 1 This increasingly common sentiment combined with adof
vancements in technology should result in the removal
92
media.'
broadcast
surrounding
restrictions
heightened
The government's argument that the commons approach can,
under some circumstances, cause interference and therefore create
some form of "scarcity," is easily remedied.' 93 If at the time the
government made its argument no regulations on power limits had
been established, the Court should suggest incentives to limit transmission power to a reasonable level or suggest pertinent legislation

that would place power limits on all transmissions, thereby avoiding
the tragedy of the commons phenomenon. 194 Some proponents of
a commons approach to spectrum allocation have already spoken
on the subject.' 9 5 These proponents suggest a commons model
should, in a sense, self-regulate by requiring operators to use the
unlicensed spectrum, but only if they comply "with the established
96
'technical etiquettes,' such as power limits on transmission."
188. See Shafer, Shrinking Newspaper, supra note 59 (explaining that many

newspapers are falling out of use). Even high profile newspapers such as the

Washington Post, New York Times, Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, Chicago
Tribune, PhiladelphiaInquirerand Newsday have had to downsize much of their staff and
trim the contents of their newspapers to stay afloat. See id.

189. See id. (explaining that because newspapers are falling out of use, many
are being retired).
190. See National Cable and Telecommunications Association, History of
Cable Television, http://www.ncta.com/About/About/HistoryofCableTelevision.
aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) ("By 2002, about 280 nationally-delivered cable

networks were available, with that number growing steadily.").

191. See Shafer, New Wave, supra note 49 (highlighting absurdity of FCC's current broadcast regulations).
192. See Carlson & Baynes, supranote 15, at 607 (explaining current licensing
system and how new technology could prove much more efficient, impacting First
Amendment rights of broadcasters).
193. See Shafer, New Wave, supra note 37 (providing that implementation of
certain practical limitations on transmitter power will prevent tragedy of commons
phenomenon without producing significant scarcity of spectrum).
194. See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 71, at 674 (suggesting multiple solutions for potential broadcaster abuse of transmission power).
195. See Sur, supra note 79 (explaining how regulations limiting power of
transmissions can avoid interference problems under commons approach).
196. Id.
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The Court hearing this argument should be eager to find a
reason to do away with broadcast media's archaic regulations. 197
This hearing provides an ideal opportunity because the Court
could easily rid broadcast media of its heightened regulations when
the government's argument is weak. 198 The scarcity the government refers to, when occasional interference exists, is wholly different from the "spectrum scarcity" rationale courts follow today. 19 9
Furthermore, this kind of interference can easily be avoided
with the implementation of legislation that regulates the power
level at which transmissions can be broadcast. 20 0 Following the rationale of previous decisions, Claimant's argument takes logical
steps in showing heightened restrictions will no longer be justified
once cognitive radio is introduced and a commons approach to licensing is implemented. 20 1 With the Court evaluating Utah's regulation under a strict scrutiny standard of review, the government is
unable to show the regulation is "narrowly tailored to further a
20 2
compelling state interest."
IV.

CONCLUSION

Cognitive radio has the ability to transform a "scarce" spectrum
into a virtually limitless spectrum. Broadcast media will, therefore,
become analogous to print media in that both can be distributed in
limitless quantities. 20 3 The rationale provided for the current differentiation in First Amendment treatment between broadcast and
print media is that there is, in fact, a limit to how much an individual can communicate via broadcast media because the airwaves are
197. See Shafer, New Wave, supra note 49 (explaining FCC "still treats the radio

spectrum like a scarce resource that its bureaucrats must manage for the 'public
good,' even though the government's scarcity argument has been ajoke for half a
century or longer").
198. For further discussion of the government's potential arguments, see
supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
199. See Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 374 (explaining inherent limitations on
spectrum make airwaves exhaustible resource).
200. See Sur, supra note 79 (suggesting transmission power caps pose simple
regulatory solution to potential signal interference under commons approach).
201. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969) (explaining
government may hold broadcasters to higher standards than other First Amend-

ment speakers because of spectrum scarcity). The court found there was "chaos"
amongst unregulated airwaves, which gave rise to the FCC's regulations. Id. at 375;
see also Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 374 (defining spectrum scarcity as inherent limit
on broadcast transmissions).
202. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 475 (2006).
203. See FE=-rE, supranote 18, at 5 (explaining how software defined radios, if

programmed properly, can harness ability to provide virtually unlimited use of
spectrum).
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inherently limited. 20 4 Due to this limitation, the government currently places more restrictions on what an individual can and cannot broadcast, as opposed to what an individual can and cannot
publish. 20 5 With cognitive radio and the commons approach to licensing, however, virtually no limits will exist to the amount able to
be broadcast over the airwaves. 20 6 Therefore, once cognitive radio
is fully implemented and a commons approach to licensing is introduced, broadcast media should enjoy the same freedoms print media currently enjoys.

20 7

Specifically, as outlined in the hypothetical First Amendment
challenge above, content-based broadcast regulations should no
20 8 Instead, the aplonger be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny.
propriate standard of review is the standard applicable to content20 9 Moreover, albased restrictions on print media: strict scrutiny.
though the hypothetical did not directly address content-neutral
regulations, following the same rationale, content-neutral broadcast
regulations should be reviewed using intermediate scrutiny, beused to review content-neutral
cause this is the standard currently
2 10
media.
print
on
regulations
In sum, cognitive radio has the ability to drastically change the
way the First Amendment operates with regard to broadcast media.
Cognitive radio has the ability to free broadcasters from the FCC's

204. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 394 (describing how spectrum scarcity creates
limit on number broadcast transmissions possible).
205. See Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 375 (describing nature of spectrum scarcity
making airwaves exhaustible resource in contrast to print media).
206. See FETrE, supra note 18, at 5 (explaining how software defined radios
will provide virtually unlimited use of spectrum); see also Symposium, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 73, at 8-9 (highlighting considerable inefficiencies on behalf of current governmental system regulating spectrum allocation).
207. See Shafer, New Wave, supra note 49 (explaining that broadcast media
regulations are already outdated, so with development of new technologies, these
restrictions will be without justification).
208. For a further discussion of Claimant's argument, see supra notes 142-60
and accompanying text.
209. See Shafer, New Wave, supra note 49 (explaining cognitive radio should
cause content-based regulations on broadcast media to be evaluated using strict
scrutiny).
210. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (explaining intermediate scrutiny is appropriate level of review for content-neutral regulations
surrounding non-broadcast media).
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overreaching imposition of regulations as "public convenience, in2 11
terest, or necessity" requires.
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